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Abstract The corporate governance environment has changed. The rate of CEO
successions is naturally trending up, succession planning is in dire need of repair, and
boards are under increasing pressure to focus on oversight. This confluence of events
creates a ‘perfect storm.’ Within this new environment, interim successions are on
the rise. But is it all bad news? This article explores the decision of corporate directors
to use temporary chief executive officers (CEOs) and the roles served by these interim
leaders. We include a typology of interim CEOs and prescribe the contexts in which
organizations can strategically pursue this type of succession. We conclude with a list
of recommendations for how boards can most effectively manage interim leadership
in the new corporate governance environment.
# 2013 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.

1. CEO succession: The crisis
continues
In 2005, Ram Charan, a noted expert on CEO succession, documented what he referred to as ‘the
CEO succession crisis.’ According to Charan (2005,
p. 72), ‘‘the CEO succession process is broken’’–—a
conclusion he drew in part because of the large
number of companies that had no meaningful succession plans. Offering advice to the directors of
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these companies, Charan stressed the importance
of enhancing internal leadership development
opportunities. Despite the abundance of expert
recommendations (e.g., develop the leadership
pipeline, consider the external labor pool, separate
the CEO and chairman roles) that followed to help
alleviate the problem (e.g., Dalton & Dalton, 2007;
NACD, 2010), it is notable that more than half a
decade since the publication of Charan’s article,
evidence is mounting that the lack of internal development opportunities may actually be getting
worse, not better. In particular, we are seeing a
dramatic increase in the number of interim CEO
successions. Why are interim successions on the
rise? When and how are interim successors used?
Is it all bad news, or could interim succession be a
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sound strategic decision for a board? In other words,
could interim succession be a way of helping to end
the crisis?

1.1. The scope of the crisis
The breakdown of the succession process is in part
due to three key factors: (1) the rise in the number
of successions, (2) the board’s lack of effective
succession planning, and (3) the board’s focus
and time commitment to oversight. The scope of
the crisis is embodied in the case of Yahoo! Incorporated.
Founded in 1994, Yet Another Hierarchical Officious Oracle, or Yahoo!, is a web portal and Internet
search engine providing a multitude of Internetbased services, including email, communities, navigation, broadband, and mobile products. Founders
David Filo and Jerry Yang incorporated the company
in 1995 and named Timothy Koogle as its first president and CEO. Through aggressive acquisitions and
development of new ventures and partnerships, the
company has grown into a global network of websites,
employing 1,400 people and reaching sales of just
under $5 billion in 2011. This growth has not always
been smooth and the company has faced challenges,
however, including difficulties with securing permanent leadership and developing a strong leadership
pipeline.
In 2001 when the Internet bubble burst, Yahoo!
experienced some financial woes. In response, the
company replaced Koogle with Terry Semel, the
former co-CEO of Warner Bros. Semel helped
the company regain financial stability and appreciate in value by about 40% each year. But in 2007,
under pressure from investors unhappy with his
performance (Yahoo!’s competitor, Google, had experienced a stock appreciation of 55% each year) or
compensation package, Semel resigned and founder
Yang assumed the role. The company announced that
Susan Decker, the expected heir apparent, was not
ready to take the top spot and charged Yang with
attracting top talent to the company. Within 18
months, after massive layoffs and cost cutting, as
revenues continued to fall, Yahoo! secured former
Autodesk CEO Carol Bartz to continue the company’s
turnaround. By 2010, Bartz had overhauled Yahoo!’s
organizational structure, cutting costs and laying off
another 5% of the workforce. A year later, Bartz was
replaced by Tim Morse, then-chief financial officer
(CFO) of Yahoo!, as the interim CEO. After four
months, Scott Thompson, former president of PayPal,
was named CEO, only to be ousted a mere 130 days
later after controversy arose over his academic
credentials. Ross Levinsohn, then-head of Yahoo!’s
new Media group, was named interim; 2 months later,
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the company proclaimed Marissa Mayer, a former
Google executive, as permanent CEO. Two months
into her tenure, Mayer gave birth to her first baby,
leaving many to wonder about the future direction of
the company. It is safe to say that Yahoo! is experiencing a succession crisis.
1.1.1. The rise in successions
The case of Yahoo! highlights key factors contributing to the succession crisis. The rate of CEO succession is naturally trending up as CEO tenure is
trending down, and much could be attributed to
financial difficulties. From 2000 to 2009, the overall
number of successions among the world’s 2,500
largest companies increased from 11.2% to 14.3%
as the average CEO tenure decreased from 8.1 to
6.3 years. CEO dismissals rose from 1.1% in the
1990s to 5.1% by 2008, and performance-related
CEO departures increased over 300% (Karlsson &
Neilson, 2010). Organizations that force out their
CEOs significantly underperform organizations that
do not, and research has indicated that many
boards are apt to oust a CEO based merely on the
potential for poor future earnings, indicating
boards continue to have little patience with underperforming leaders. Over its 18 year history, Yahoo!
has experienced six permanent CEOs, four of which
left as a result of underperformance, and two
interim CEOs. In the past year alone, the board
has selected two permanent CEOs and one interim
CEO. This rise in succession, and the succession
challenges experienced at Yahoo!, illustrates a
longstanding and well-documented problem contributing to the crisis: the board’s struggle to manage succession planning.
1.1.2. Lack of succession planning
The National Association of Corporate Directors
(NACD) has conducted research on over 4,200 public
companies regarding corporate governance issues.
In its 2011 report, the NACD presented disturbing
evidence suggesting a continued lack of comprehensive succession planning processes by the board. The
good news? A greater number of boards (77%) are
focusing on the development of internal candidates
and a majority of boards (74%) have put in place an
emergency succession plan, with over half having an
interim CEO identified. The bad news? Nearly half of
respondents indicated that their board’s succession
plan is informal and that there is no long-term plan
(e.g., 3 to 5 years out) in place. Only 30% of the
boards have plans for the engagement of an executive search firm to identify external candidates, and
nearly 10% indicated that there is no succession plan
(NACD, 2011). Research from the Spencer Stuart
Board Index found similar results for the S&P 500.
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Though most boards reported discussing CEO succession planning, 30% do not have a long-term or
emergency succession plan, 60% do not have a
documented description of the skills required for
the next CEO, and just over half do not have a formal
process to review internal candidates. Most boards
agree that CEO succession is a top priority, but 43%
of these same boards view themselves as ineffective
at managing this process (Spencer Stuart, 2011).
This research is consistent with Yahoo!’s experience, where lack of a talent pipeline led the board
to select outside CEOs. While this can be an effective succession strategy (Ocasio, 1999), outside
CEOs have a higher likelihood of failure (Fredrickson,
Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Zhang, 2008). Selecting external CEO hires may deter the board from
considering internal replacements and limit efforts
toward actively grooming and preparing potential
insiders. Separate research conducted by Heidrick
and Struggles and the Rock Center for Corporate
Governance at Stanford University found that a
mere 54% of boards were actively grooming an
heir apparent and 39% of board members reported
having no viable internal candidates (‘‘New CEO,’’
2010). This begs the question: How can a board
expect to have a CEO ready if it is not currently
grooming a successor? For Yahoo!, the answer is
the board cannot, and does not. The only two internal
candidates named CEO served on an interim basis. As
one expert noted, ‘‘lack of succession planning at
some of the biggest public companies poses a serious
threat to corporate health’’ (‘‘New CEO,’’ 2010, p. 1).
The boards are aware of their own deficits in
succession planning. In 2009, the NACD examined
governance issues on two dimensions: (1) importance to the board and (2) effectiveness in the
board’s handling. While 34% of the boards identified
CEO succession as critical, a mere 15.7% of directors
ranked themselves as highly effective at managing
succession (NACD, 2009). By 2011, boards identified
CEO succession as their 5th priority; when asked who
was responsible for development of an executive
talent management program, nearly half indicated
it was the sole responsibility of management (NACD,
2011). Yet, turnover and turmoil among the top
leadership creates challenges in identifying and
grooming potential top talent.
Why do boards appear to be ignoring the advice of
experts and disregarding the best practices of companies successfully managing succession? One possible explanation is insufficient time dedicated to
succession planning. According to the Heidrick and
Struggles research, boards reported spending an
average of 2 hours per year on succession planning.
David Larcker, a business professor at the Stanford
graduate school, suggests ‘‘boards of directors
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just aren’t spending the time that is required to
adequately prepare for a succession scenario’’
(‘‘New CEO,’’ 2010, p. 1). These researchers concluded that the primary reason for a lapse in governance was a lack of focus. Adding another layer of
complexity are the socio-political factors likely at
play when a board attempts to plan for the next
CEO. As research implies (Ocasio, 1994; Shen &
Cannella, 2002a), very powerful CEOs (e.g., older
insiders who hold the position of chairperson and
have a large amount of stock) tend to have longer
tenures than other top executives. A powerful CEO
may become entrenched and comfortable in her
role as ‘alpha’ and may be disinclined to plan her
own departure. As chairperson, the CEO leads board
meetings, and may be reluctant to even include
succession on the agenda, complicating matters
for the board. If the CEO is performing well, she
may not recognize it is time to move on. A boardinitiated succession plan may upset the CEO (‘‘Why
am I being pushed out when I’ve done so well for the
company?’’), who then may be reluctant to plan and
groom the successor. Consider Warren Buffet, CEO
of Berkshire Hathaway, who at the age of 82 still
held the title of president, typically a symbolic title
bestowed on the heir apparent. Buffet announced
that Howard Buffet, his son and a member of the
board, would be his successor as the non-executive
chairman, and identified an heir, but did not reveal
his/her name or a timeline for the transition. If the
CEO is underperforming or is a poor fit for the
organization, the board would presumably not want
her help. The company may be in need of strategic
changes but may have difficulties selecting and
grooming the successor while the current CEO is
still in office. This appears to be consistent with
Yahoo!’s situation, in which four of the permanent
CEOs stepped down or were forced out due to
underperformance and their successors were each
charged with turning around the company. Either
way, politics and power complicate the selection
process. Why are boards not dedicating time to fix
the succession process? A look at the new corporate
governance environment may shed some light on
this issue.
1.1.3. The era of oversight
The final factor contributing to the succession crisis
is the time and focus that boards place on oversight.
Directors, like most corporate executives, tend to
focus on short-term issues, particularly when faced
with scarce and competing resources (e.g., time).
Even if the board has a longer-term strategic plan,
when confronted with pressing issues requiring immediate attention, the board’s focus often turns to
quarterly matters. Though not new, this short-term
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focus appears to have intensified under the new
corporate governance environment. The word of
the day is ‘oversight,’ as directors are under increasing pressure to be fully engaged in their oversight
role. It is, and always has been, the board’s fiduciary
responsibility to ensure senior managers are making
decisions that are in the best long-term interests of
the organization. Yet, the missteps and mistakes at
Enron and Worldcom leading up to Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX) and the financial meltdown in 2008 leading to
the Dodd-Frank Act have put increasing pressure on
boards to actively manage and oversee the strategic
decisions and activities of the top executives, and in
particular the CEO. In 2011, the NACD asked directors to identify the highest priorities facing boards.
A majority of directors (72.1%) agreed that strategic
planning and oversight was the highest priority for
the board and risk and crisis oversight was an additional critical priority (NACD, 2011).
Certainly, the current strategic direction of the
firm or the financial strength of the organization
must be discussed and assessed now. These matters
cannot be pushed back a year, or even 6 months, as a
delay in addressing these critical issues could lead to
serious consequences, such as a lack of competitiveness or financial viability. Boards must be sure they
are following the rules of SOX and fulfilling the
oversight and auditing requirements. These issues
that demand attention are no less complicated and
could easily take up much of the board’s time and
energy during meetings, pushing issues such as leadership pipeline development to the end, or even
to the next agenda. Though boards should address
all of these matters, like so many organizations
and groups, they have limited resources; the most
critical is time, which is increasingly being filled by
expectations of oversight. Further complicating the
matter are mounting requirements for effectively
managing CEO succession.
The succession process itself has undergone a
transformation. Past are the days Richard Vancil
(1987) described, when much of the responsibility
for selecting, grooming, and ‘passing the baton’ was
left to the current CEO. Because today’s boards have
a greater percentage of outside directors and more
are opting to separate the CEO and chair positions,
directors are shouldering a bigger role in succession
planning. Ultimately what has occurred is that the
board’s responsibility for succession planning and
executive talent development has increased, but
the ability of directors and time available to do this
has not kept pace. This appears to be the case at
Yahoo!. In the post-SOX environment, the board
must spend additional time ensuring adherence to
the new rules and regulations, taking time away
from effectively managing succession.
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2. Increasing successions + Poor
succession planning + Oversight
environment = Interim succession?
When rising CEO successions crash into poor succession planning in an environment of increasing scrutiny and oversight, is the result a perfect corporate
governance storm? If so, what are the markers that
tell us when we are in the midst of this storm? Is it
judicious to ask whether the increasing trend of
interim CEOs is one of these markers?
Recent research reveals that interim successions
make up anywhere from 18% to 20% of all successions (Ballinger & Marcel, 2010). More and more
companies–—like Denny’s, E*Trade, First Data, Tyson,
Sears, Six Flags, and UBS–—have opted for temporary
leadership. Even organizations that were recently
highlighted as having best practices in succession
planning throughout the leadership pipeline (e.g.,
Boeing, Citigroup, Hewlett-Packard) have employed
interim CEOs (Karaevli & Hall, 2003). The question
remains: What happens when interim CEOs are
selected? Are they simply a sign of a failed succession
or is there some strategic value to selecting an
interim CEO?

2.1. Interim succession: A failed plan or a
strategic choice?
Interim succession has traditionally been viewed as
an unsuccessful succession, a clear sign that the
board has failed to develop the leadership pipeline
(Dalton & Dalton, 2007) and must appoint a temporary executive to keep the seat warm while the
board searches for a permanent replacement. In
our most recent research, we discovered that
boards are selecting interims for a variety of other
reasons (Mooney, Semadeni, & Kesner, 2012). We
identified five additional types of interim CEOs,
including the contender, groomer, marketer, fixer,
and cleaner (see Table 1).
The contender is the interim CEO who is the likely
permanent replacement (e.g., a member of the top
management team) but who has been given the
temporary label. The board selects a contender
when it wants assurance it has chosen the best
executive for the job. A contender must prove to
the board that she is a good fit by operating as a
permanent CEO. Meanwhile, the board has a chance
to assess the contender, comparing her to other
potential candidates both within and outside of
the organization. One place we frequently see the
contender interim CEO is in academia, where it is
customary to select an interim dean–—many times an
associate dean, a program chair, or a department
head–—to allow the selection committee to

Interim succession: Temporary leadership in the midst of the perfect storm
Table 1.
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The six types of interim successors*

Type of interim CEO

Characteristics and role of interim

Seat Warmer

Board member, typically non-executive chairman, who fills the role while the board
searches for a replacement

Contender

C-level executive in contention for permanent position who proves her competence as
board assesses and compares to external candidates

Groomer

Former CEO and/or founder who prepares and ‘grooms’ the next permanent successor,
an internal executive likely named heir apparent at time of interim succession

Marketer

Board member with expertise in negotiations tapped to help ready the organization
for an initial public offering or sale

Fixer

Former CEO and/or chairman of the board focused on repairing the existing companies
to reverse the initial stages of financial decline

Cleaner

Professional interim or turnaround specialist charged with making severe changes,
such as divesting companies, in order to avoid bankruptcy and organizational failure

*

Adapted from Mooney et al. (2012)

complete the due diligence of comparing the best
internal candidates to potential external replacements. This process helps the school not only gain
assurance that it has selected the best top executive
for the position, but also acquire potential ideas for
moving the school forward and building its network
through exposure to important players in the industry. Organizations in the corporate arena are likely
to experience similar benefits when pursuing an
interim contender approach to succession.
The groomer is the former CEO and/or founder
who steps back into the CEO position temporarily.
The role of the groomer is to prepare the permanent
successor. While this may appear to be a seat warmer, certain elements indicate the difference. First,
the appointment of the groomer is accompanied by
the designation of an heir apparent (e.g., a top
management team member promoted to COO and
president). Second, the groomer’s job is to focus on
managing external stakeholders and act as a spokesperson while enabling the heir apparent to manage
the day-to-day operations and develop her skills and
expertise. Last, the time horizons differ. The seat
warmer typically serves for less than 3 months,
while the groomer typically stays between 6 and
12 months. The groomer-heir apparent relationship
is very similar to a traditional succession in which
the permanent CEO designates an heir and then
passes the baton within a year. So why is there a
need for the interim title? Why not just use this
traditional method? The groomer typically follows a
short-tenured CEO ousted due to ill fit with the
culture or poor performance issues. When a CEO
leaves suddenly and does so early in his tenure,
there is a gap in the leadership: the next in
line likely needs more training and grooming before
taking the reins. The interim groomer closes the

gap in leadership caused by a tight succession timeline.
When an organization is looking to sell, whether
through an initial public offering (IPO) or an acquisition, boards may use interim CEOs to find potential
buyers. These marketer interims focus on managing
the external constituents, such as marketing the
organization to potential investors or negotiating
with potential buyers. The marketer interim typically comes from the board (e.g., an executive
who has experience with the organization) and also
has expertise negotiating organizational sales. But
again, why the need for an interim? Why not simply
have the current permanent CEO fulfill this role?
Here, an interim is more effective because the CEO
is being charged with negotiating herself right out of
a job. It is rare that an acquired firm, or one which
has gone public, keeps the same top executive
structure after the deal is complete. An interim
marketer stays focused on the sale of the company,
not on the long-term viability of her job.
The fixer and the cleaner are the final two interims we uncovered. Both serve for longer time horizons (e.g., 12 to 18 months) and are selected when
organizations are struggling, but each has different
strategic imperatives. The fixer focuses on repairing
existing companies within the organization, both
strategically and operationally, enabling the organization to become more efficient and effective. In
some cases, difficult decisions must be made (e.g.,
restructuring divisions which may lead to job
losses), but the goal is to reinstate the financial
health of the organization. The cleaner is tapped
when the organization is struggling to survive, when
bankruptcy is eminent, and far more severe decisions (e.g., divesting entire segments of the
business) must be made. In many cases, a cleaner
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is a professional interim: an executive who has the
experience and expertise to come into a failing
organization and stop the financial hemorrhaging,
stabilize the company, and prepare it for the permanent replacement. The advantage of selecting
temporary leadership to carry out these types of
tasks is threefold. First, it is sometimes difficult for
a permanent CEO to make significant and unpopular
decisions, as she may have to live with them for the
long term. Second, finding a permanent CEO with
the necessary expertise and experience may be
challenging. Finally, the price premium associated
with selecting a permanent CEO to carry out these
rather short-term tasks would be far greater than
that of a temporary leader.
In all cases, the use of interims appears to be a
function of the current corporate governance environment. The succession context has become increasingly complex (e.g., skill intricacies of CEOs
concurrent with decrease in CEO tenure), which
strains a changing succession planning process at
a time when oversight in the governance environment is at an all-time high. Interim successions
appear to be one way the board is responding to
this perfect corporate governance storm. What does
this mean for the board? If interim succession is a
sign of the perfect storm, and boards are using
interims more often to deal with the uncertainty
surrounding succession and the scrutiny of the corporate governance environment, is this good? The
answer is: It depends.

place and to consider a priori possible scenarios in
which an interim succession is the best alternative.
The board must determine the needs of the company under alternative scenarios, the types of interims
to best fit these needs, and the executives available
to fill these interim roles.

3.1. The strategic selection of interim
CEOs
Building on extant research and our own observations, we identify scenarios in which companies
might strategically and effectively pursue interim
succession. Within these scenarios, we observe elements such as CEO tenure, poor organizational
performance, and industry changes, which introduce additional uncertainty to an already disruptive
event. In describing these situations, we identify
the organization’s needs as a result of the situation
and how an interim executive might meet these
needs more effectively than a permanent executive. This inventory of organizational situations is
not meant to be exhaustive, but rather a description
of common scenarios observed and guidance for
organizations to strategically use interim succession
(see Table 2).
3.1.1. What just happened? The unexpected
departure of the CEO
When the CEO departs suddenly, the board is left
with an emergency situation–—much like when the
CEO dies, but with more complications. Many times,
CEO departures result from poor fit between the
leadership style of the CEO and the organization’s
culture; as such, they tend to occur early in a CEO’s
term (e.g., within the first 5 years). This was the case
with Robert Nardelli, who resigned as CEO of Home
Depot in 2007, just 2 weeks after stating to critics
and the press that he had no intention of leaving.
During his tenure with the home improvement chain,
Nardelli helped the company grow earnings annually.
While the board would not elaborate on Nardelli’s

3. Interim succession: A contingency
model
Under what circumstances does it make strategic
sense for a board to engage in interim succession?
Seat warmer interims should never be employed.
Even in an emergency situation (e.g., the CEO gets
hit by the proverbial bus), the board could appoint a
more strategic type of interim if a permanent CEO is
not readily available. The key is to have a plan in
Table 2.

Strategic selection of interim CEOs
Scenario

Organizational needs

Unexpected CEO departure

Transition
Continuity
Certainty

Dismissal of CEO

Strategic change
Turnaround management
Transition

Retirement of long-tenured CEO

Transition to new CEO
Time to identify and groom an heir
Strategic change

Interim roles
Groomer
Contender
Fixer
Cleaner
Groomer
Contender
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abrupt departure, many speculated a clash between Home Depot’s entrepreneurial spirit and
service-driven culture and the CEO’s centralized,
numbers-driven, top-down leadership style. CEOs
also often leave due to power struggles with the
board, as was the case when Citigroup Inc.’s CEO
Vikram Pandit abruptly departed in October 2012
after clashes with board chairman Michael O’Neill.
In both given examples, the boards chose to replace
the CEO immediately with a permanent successor.
But what if the company does not have someone at
the ready? In this case, an interim might strategically help the organization.
When a CEO leaves early in her tenure due to
cultural or sociopolitical challenges, she likely never
effectively led the company or established and
strengthened the culture. This produces a great
deal of uncertainty regarding leadership and future
direction of the organization. It also affects the
board, which has lost its groomer for the next
CEO; the predecessor may not have had sufficient
time to identify, much less cultivate, a replacement. Further, if the CEO is a poor fit or is underperforming, the board may not want her selecting
the replacement. This lack of permanent leadership
increases uncertainty for the organization, not only
around the current state of leadership, but also
surrounding future leadership and direction of the
organization.
Following an abrupt CEO departure, the interim
can smooth the company’s transition from its previous leader to a more stable, permanent CEO. He or
she could serve during a transition period, when the
organization and its employees have time to recover
from the former CEO’s decisions and get ready for
changes likely to occur under new leadership. While
the interim CEO is busy transitioning the company,
the board has time to complete a thorough search
for the new CEO. A groomer or contender interim
would be most effective in serving the organization.
As the former CEO, a groomer would increase certainty, since he is a known leader, and ensure a level
of continuity in priming the heir apparent. While the
groomer’s role is very similar to the classic relay
succession, the interim title is an important distinction: it sends a strong message that the past CEO is
not coming back to adopt old strategies, but rather
help prepare the successor to lead. Interim leadership allows employees to gain comfort in the familiar while giving a definitive timeline to prepare for
the transition to the new leadership. External stakeholders are better equipped to assess the leadership
as they know the former CEO will not be the permanent replacement, but rather help move the
company forward. There are constraints to engaging
in this type of interim succession. For instance, the
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board must have access to the former CEO or founder. Many times, these executives still sit on the
board, particularly when the CEO departs early in
her tenure. The board must also be able to identify
an heir apparent to be groomed. If there is a deep
leadership pipeline and the board is managing this
for succession 5 to 10 years out, this will not be a
problem. However, if the board has not developed a
solid succession plan with potential future CEOs
identified, this type of interim succession will be
much more difficult to accomplish.
The contender interim might also fill this role. As
a member of the top management team, a contender knows intimately the workings of the organization, including the culture. While the contender
may make some changes to prove his strategic
competence and leadership capabilities to the
board, he is also likely to bring a level of certainty
and continuity to the organization, comforting employees and external stakeholders since they can
infer much about the contender’s strategic intentions as an insider. There are advantages to identifying the contender as an interim and not as the
permanent replacement. Securing a contender
gives the board a chance to see this executive in
action, and not simply guess what type of leader he
will be. This helps reduce the likelihood of another
abrupt CEO departure due to ill fit. It allows the
board adequate time to conduct a wider, more
thorough search for a new CEO, and have confidence
that it has selected the best possible leader. Finally,
if the board does choose an external candidate, the
market is less likely to view the transition negatively
(e.g., as a failed permanent succession), but rather
as the expected transition from a temporary to a
permanent leader. As with the groomer interim, a
critical aspect of pursuing this type of succession is
having a deep leadership pipeline from which to tap
potential contenders.
3.1.2. You’re out of here! The dismissal of
the CEO
Boards are dismissing CEOs at a greater rate than
ever (Zhang, 2008). Many dismissals are a result of
poor organizational performance or negative assessments by external stakeholders (Wiersema & Zhang,
2011). In other cases, boards appear to be dismissing
CEOs proactively, more for their low ability (Ertugrul
& Krishnan, 2011) and the potential for poor performance. CEO dismissals tend to be abrupt (Wiersema,
2002) and occur within the first 3 years of a CEO’s
tenure. This is likely a signaling effect, as the board
may be trying to send a strong and swift message:
‘‘We messed up and we are going to do something
about it. . . immediately!’’ When an heir is in place
and present, there is an increased likelihood of CEO
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dismissal when performance is low (Zhang, 2006).
This is not surprising: the board may feel more
comfortable dismissing the CEO when it has an heir
apparent ready to assume the lead role. But what
should a board do if there is need to dismiss the CEO
to stop organizational performance decline and no
heir is ready? It might select a seat warmer, as in the
case of E*Trade, when the board dismissed Steven
Freiberg for poor performance and appointed board
member Frank Petrilli as interim CEO to maintain the
company until a permanent replacement was found.
But when an organization is underperforming, can it
really risk waiting things out? Alternatively, a board
could opt for the fixer or cleaner to help pull the
organization through tough times and right the ship
before securing a permanent replacement.
In these cases, interim CEOs would serve a much
different purpose: to make the tough decisions,
such as selling off poor-performing segments of
the business or restructuring the firm’s portfolio
to curtail financial decline and enable the company
to compete strategically again. The more extreme
the performance losses, the more drastic the
changes and cost-cutting measures are likely to
be. An interim in this context might well help the
organization through Chapter 11, as was the case for
Sharper Image when it hired turnaround specialist
Robert Conway in February 2008 and closed all of its
retail stores later that year to become an onlineonly merchandiser. In extreme cases, the interim
may lead the company to the end of its days. But
why select an interim in this case? Why not a permanent CEO? First, it could prove challenging, attracting a qualified permanent CEO to a poorperforming firm. Why would a CEO want to take on
a dismal performance situation? Second, if the board
could find a candidate, the price would likely be high.
The power would be in the CEO’s hands, particularly if
she had proven turnaround experience, which is what
the organization would need. The board might indeed
be searching for the ‘corporate savior’ and pay dearly
if it selects a permanent CEO to fill this role (Khurana,
2002). An interim, whether a fixer or a cleaner,
would be more cost effective. Last–—as previously
mentioned–—an interim fixer or cleaner is charged
with making the tough decisions and will likely be
more effective at carrying out some very unpopular,
yet necessary, strategic moves to turn around
organizational performance.
3.1.3. Must you go? Retirement of the longtenured CEO
Just as the short-tenured, unexpected departure
introduces challenges to the succession process, so
does the expected retirement of the long-tenured
CEO, particularly when he or she is a well-liked and
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respected leader. This was the case in August 2010
when 71-year-old Omnicare CEO Joel F. Gemunder
retired and board member James D. Shelton stepped
into the position on an interim basis. Gemunder’s
retirement was planned, yet the Omnicare board
was not adequately prepared, so it appointed
Shelton to keep the seat warm while a permanent
CEO search was conducted. Why was an heir not
ready? There are several possible explanations.
While a longer-tenure CEO may bring stability and
certainty to an organization, this limits leadership
opportunities for promising internal replacement
candidates. If a CEO serves an organization for
8 years and does not anticipate retiring, the next
in line may leave to seek leadership opportunities
elsewhere. As the tenure of that CEO grows to
10 years, the route to the top for many potential
CEO contenders becomes less clear. Furthermore,
the retiring CEO may not be keen on preparing for
her own demise, as she has successfully served as
the leader for such a long time. This situation brings
challenges to the selection and grooming process
for an internal succession. Longer-tenure CEOs are
associated with poorer organizational performance
(Shen & Cannella, 2002b), suggesting that an
external replacement may make strategic sense.
Yet, an external search might send a message to the
current CEO that strategic change is necessary–—a
message the board may not want to send to the
well-liked CEO. Given these additional challenges,
an interim CEO might well serve the organization.
A contender interim could be a strategic selection. The contender might pursue some changes to
help improve organizational performance. At the
same time, the interim title gives employees time
to transition to the new CEO. This may be particularly critical, as the organization has likely not gone
through significant changes in quite some time. The
mere retirement of the long-tenured CEO will be a
significant change and a contender can help with
that transition while still moving the organization
forward. Concurrently, the board can begin its external search to gain confidence that the contender
is the best CEO, or if not, find the best replacement.
The contender interim allows the board to test the
waters and see if the internal candidate can live up
to following such a revered CEO, while doing its due
diligence of an external search. The interim title
also allows the board to conduct the search without
offending the former CEO and helps the board manage external stakeholders (e.g., avoid a failed succession if the contender does succeed).
While interim succession should not be used to
replace sound succession planning, certain situations introduce unique challenges for succession
planning. In these cases, interim succession, if
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pursued strategically, can help an organization effectively navigate the succession process and transition smoothly to permanent leadership.

4. Interim succession planning: The
long and the short of it
With mounting evidence that boards are not effectively handling succession planning, there has been
no shortage of sound advice (e.g., involve the entire
board, create selection criteria, use formal assessments, interact with potential candidates, develop
a contingency plan for emergency scenarios) from
industry experts and corporate governance activists
about how to fix the crisis (see NACD, 2006 and
Dalton & Dalton, 2007 for comprehensive recommendations). However, with the eye of the storm
upon us, and the potential for more unexpected
successions, we see opportunities for boards to
focus on contingency plans and more effectively
navigate through the chaos and uncertainty of the
new corporate governance environment via use of
interim leadership. Boards can do this by considering the interim-driving factors, creating an interim
succession plan, and managing the interim succession process. Next, we outline our specific recommendations for how boards can effectively manage
interim succession.

4.1. Interim succession: A long-term
perspective
The first step in effectively utilizing interim succession is to hold a long-term perspective about this
short-term leadership matter. Being open to the
idea that it is a viable type of succession and the
belief that an interim might better serve the organization in certain scenarios allows the board to
create a long-term plan. Boards must also decide
when interim successions will and will not work.
Interim successions should complement the leadership pipeline and should be employed when the
permanent leadership is not a proper fit for the
context at hand. Finally, boards should identify
possible scenarios that their companies might face
and the type of leadership that would best fit those
circumstances. Pursuing one of these interim successions may have helped Yahoo!.
When Terry Semel was suddenly pushed out as
CEO, founder Jerry Yang was tapped as his replacement because the designated heir apparent, Susan
Decker, was not ready to lead the company. Yang
was not officially named interim and it appears
he was not explicitly grooming the heir, as his
successor was an outside selection charged with
turning around the company. Carol Bartz, who
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appeared to be a fixer, also was not designated as
an interim, and when she left just 2 years into her
term, it appeared to be a failed succession. What
might have happened if Yahoo! had named interims
to fill the role of groomer, for example? Might Yang
have focused on getting Decker ready to take the
reins? Or might the company have been better off
designating Bartz as an interim in the role of fixing
the company? It is hard to say whether changing
some of these permanent CEO titles to interim
would have significantly altered the financial
outcome of the company. At the very least, the
company would have avoided a series of failed
successions by engaging interim CEOs focused on
very specific strategic tasks. It remains to be seen
whether the current CEO should be an interim.

4.2. Interim succession: The short-term
actions
Interim succession invites uncertainty regarding
leadership of the organization and future direction
and viability of the company. The board can reduce
this uncertainty by taking specific actions in the near
term. Step one is for the board to find the right
interim CEO for the job. The board will need to
develop a set of criteria to help identify what skills
are required of the interim. There will be certain
pervasive skills, or ‘order qualifiers,’ that interims
should have in order to be successful. Not unlike a
permanent CEO, an interim must be an exceptional
communicator. The interim must also possess impressive multi-tasking capabilities; she will have
responsibility over a great deal of the organization
and operations of the company. Considering these
pervasive skills as order qualifiers allows the board
to create a short list of potential interim CEO
candidates. Boards should then consider the particular context in which the interim will serve and decide
what unique skills, or ‘order winners,’ are required
for the job. Skills the board might consider important include knowledge of the organization and/or
industry, expertise in a particular area (e.g., finance, marketing), and experience in a particular
context (e.g., turnaround management). The board
must also set expectations for the interim CEO and
create an environment conducive to the interim
effectively fulfilling these expected roles. The
board and prospective interim CEO should discuss
up front the critical aspects of the temporary employment arrangement. In some cases, the arrangement might be similar to that of a permanent CEO.
In others, the temporary nature of the role and
the specific needs of the organization may introduce new complexities to the arrangement. To most
effectively manage interim leadership, boards must
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Decisions to address in interim successions
Recommendations for the board when hiring an interim CEO

1. Set goals for the interim

Understand the goals of the interim succession and create clear, concise,
short-term goals for the interim CEO

2. Create a succession timeline

Set the timeframe and honor it

3. Establish a structure for
communication

Determine the structure of the relationship between the interim and the
organization and set expectations for internal communications

4. Address who will serve as
spokesperson

Appoint a spokesperson, either the interim or a board member, to interface
with external constituents

5. Delegate stakeholder
management

Develop a stakeholder management plan for both internal and external
constituents

6. Determine resource
availability

Understand and provide the resources necessary to achieve the
predetermined goals

7. Establish evaluation criteria

Set evaluation criteria based on the goals of interim succession

8. Determine interim’s role in
CEO transition

Establish what role the interim will take in the selection and transition
to permanent leadership

9. Negotiate compensation

Determine amount consistent with purpose of the succession

10. Adopt an exit strategy

Determine the transition from interim to permanent successor

address these issues a priori. Specifically, we recommend that boards consider ten items when engaging in interim succession (see Table 3).

4.3. Ten recommendations for the board
when hiring an interim
4.3.1. Set goals for the interim
The board should set clear and concise goals that
reinforce the reason it opted for an interim appointment. Given the nature of temporary leadership,
the goals should be short-term focused. While the
board should consider the longer-term implications
of these goals, the interim should stay focused on
the short-term. Long-term objectives are appropriate for the permanent CEO.
4.3.2. Create a succession timeline
The board must then determine a timeline to
achieve these goals. A predetermined timeframe
provides a deadline for the interim CEO in achieving
the goals and for the board in selecting a permanent
successor. Barring extraordinary events, the board
should aspire to honor this timeline, as it will help
reduce the uncertainty surrounding temporary leadership. A timeline gives both internal and external
stakeholders a sense of certainty about when permanent leadership will resume. Without this, toplevel staff often choose to pursue other employment
as the leadership pipeline may no longer be clear,
and it can become more difficult for the company to
attract a permanent successor willing to come into
this uncertain environment. This was the case with

Sears, when chairman and majority owner Edward
Lampert appointed W. Bruce Johnson interim CEO
for an indeterminate amount of time. Three years
later, after the company lost four chief financial
officers and two senior vice presidents to resignations, Lampert finally named a permanent replacement. Sears may have needed an interim for this
longer period of time to aid in its financial turnaround. However, lack of certainty regarding tenure
of the interim chief left employees wondering about
their leadership opportunities, and analysts confused as to how to assess the future direction of
the organization.
4.3.3. Establish an appropriate structure for
communications with the interim CEO
The interim is unlikely to be the head of all aspects
of the company. There must be a permanent executive, possibly a non-executive chairman or lead
director, to provide continuity throughout the interim succession. The board should determine who this
permanent top executive will be and the structure
of her relationship with the interim CEO. The structure of this relationship, and the roles that each
executive takes on, will vary and be driven by the
purpose of the interim succession and the specific
goals outlined for the interim leader. The relationship
between the interim CEO and the board must be
clearly defined to facilitate her meeting the predetermined goals within the specified timeframe.
Although ensuring free access between directors
and the interim CEO is a must, routine communications between board meetings may be best handled
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through the permanent executive to make certain
that issues are addressed in a coordinated and efficient manner. This also reduces the likelihood of the
board micromanaging from the sidelines. We recommend that, at the onset of the appointment, the
board determine its expectations regarding communications from the interim. How often should the
interim provide updates? What information does
the board want/need? What mechanisms are in place
for the board to communicate with the interim? This
is critical for a temporary leader as the tenure is
greatly abbreviated, yet the goals can be expansive.
4.3.4. Address who will serve as spokesperson
for the company
In determining the structure of the relationship
between the interim and the organization, the
board must decide who will take on specific roles
traditionally filled by a CEO. Who will be the spokesperson? Who will interface with the media and the
investment community? Communicating and managing information with these external stakeholders
is the role of a permanent CEO. In the case of an
interim, it may be more effective to share this
responsibility with a permanent executive. By involving other executives, unnecessary distractions,
which might inhibit the interim CEO from achieving
the organization’s goals in the intended timeframe,
are minimized. Shared responsibility may also help
the organization manage the uncertainty brought on
by temporary leadership. For example, an interim
whose key goal is to turn around the company will
need to focus on the operational aspects of the
organization. At the same time, it will be necessary
to have an ongoing dialogue with external constituents, such as the investment community, to keep
them informed of changes that are occurring and to
squelch potential fears of bankruptcy. In this case, a
lead director may help calm fears and provide continuity and certainty for these constituents. Importantly, the interim CEO and everyone supporting her
must coordinate their messages so there is consistency and efficiency to this divide and conquer
spokesperson approach.
4.3.5. Delegate the management of
stakeholders
The board must develop a stakeholder management
plan. As mentioned, it is critical that the board keep
the interim’s distractions to a minimum such that
she may complete the temporary job assigned to
her. It is also important for the board, as the permanent leading body of the company, to determine
which stakeholders need to interact with the interim CEO and which would benefit from interfacing
with the permanent executive. This largely depends
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on the goals of the interim succession. An interim
hired to clean up the organization will want to interface with employees, key customers, and suppliers,
as significant changes will be needed to turn around
the company’s performance; a lead director, on the
other hand, may be better equipped to manage
external constituents. A marketer interim will need
to focus on managing expectations with shareholders, investors, and analysts, while the COO manages
day-to-day operations. The interim may need to
focus on managing all stakeholders, as in the case
of an interim being tested for the top position. Having
the opportunity to interact with and manage all the
critical constituents will allow the board to see how
the contender fulfills these roles.
4.3.6. Determine resource availability
It is critical that the board and the interim CEO
determine the resources necessary to carry out the
intended goals. The board needs to determine what
resources it can make available and then explicitly
communicate this to the interim. This is one of the
most critical aspects for the board to decide, as
directors must be confident that the resources available are sufficient to complete the goals of the
succession.
4.3.7. Establish evaluation criteria
The board should establish criteria on which to evaluate the interim. These criteria will be driven by the
rationale behind the succession and the timeframe
developed, and should be aligned with the goals put
forth by the board. The evaluation criteria should be
clear, specific, and achievable. If the overall rationale behind the interim succession is company performance turnaround, for example, the board might
determine that the interim will have 1 year to make
the company profitable. The evaluation criteria
should specify exactly how much profit growth is
expected. What are the expectations for revenue
or for costs? If the purpose of interim succession is
to prepare the heir apparent for permanent succession, then the goals for the interim will center on
grooming and mentoring the future permanent CEO
and the evaluation criteria should be consistent with
this. This process ensures that the interim CEO is
clear about how her performance as an interim will be
measured. It is only through this type of evaluation
that the board can determine whether or not the
interim succession was a success.
4.3.8. Determine the interim’s role in
transitioning to permanent CEO
The board must determine what role it would like
the interim to take in the selection of and transition
to permanent leadership. The board should also

632
identify possible internal candidates and then decide whether or not to engage a firm for an external
search. A groomer is likely to be involved in all of
these steps given his knowledge and expertise. A
contender is unlikely to be involved in this, as she is
vying for the permanent position. Interims that are
charged with turning around the company (e.g.,
fixer, cleaner) may also help in the process, if the
board feels it needs to make a clean break from past
strategies. The board should decide a priori and be
clear about how much the interim will or will not be
involved in the transition process.
4.3.9. Negotiate compensation
The compensation decision for an interim may not
appear to be a critical piece of the interim succession
process, but it should be. If a board is appointing an
interim as a seat warmer, then the compensation of
that executive may be of little importance given the
job and short duration. If, however, the board is
looking to engage strategically in an interim succession, then deciding how to compensate the interim
becomes as important a factor as in a permanent
succession. The board should aim to set a level that
matches the requirements of the job. The compensation should be high enough to attract the best executive, but not exceed what is necessary given the task.
4.3.10. Determine an exit strategy
As with any type of succession, a board should have a
plan for the transition to the next CEO. If the board
has engaged an interim CEO to help groom the successor, then the transition may look like a traditional
succession. If an interim is serving to market and
sell the company, and the company is then acquired,
the transition of the interim will look much different.
The transition will–—and should–—vary, as it will largely be determined by the goals of the succession and
the time frame for interim leadership. The source
of the permanent successor will also influence how
the board chooses to transition from interim to permanent leadership. A clean break from interim to
permanent may be more appropriate in an outside
succession. Regardless of the type, it is important
that the board has an exit strategy.

5. Concluding thoughts
The evidence seems clear that CEO succession continues to be in crisis. Further, this crisis appears to
be perpetuated by the perfect storm of increasing
CEO turnover, persistently poor succession planning,
and heightened oversight in the corporate governance environment. What role does interim succession have in this context? A critical one. Interim
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CEOs are being selected more often, in a variety of
different scenarios, and for a multitude of purposes.
By opting for temporary leadership, the board may
well have a better chance of selecting the right CEO
and setting the company straight. The board must
begin the rigorous task of developing a comprehensive and sound succession plan to help stay on track.
Nevertheless, interim leadership appears to be a
viable aid in emerging from the crisis. Further,
interims have changed in their roles and responsibilities, and in many cases, they provide strategic
value above and beyond the extra time for the
search process. If interim CEOs are to be tapped,
they should have a specified role in the succession
process–—not as a result of no plan, but specifically
because there is a plan. Interims can, and should, be
strategically used to contend with the unexpected
circumstances as part of a ‘Plan B.’ Whether the
perfect storm is presented by Mother Nature or the
challenging business climate now upon us, the only
answer to these complex situations is to plan in
advance and execute effectively on that plan. We
believe that interim CEO appointments can be a
useful part of that process.
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